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ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to provide a developing economy perspective to the corporate dividend puzzle, this 
study basically examined the effects of ownership structure and financial leverage on the divi-
dend payouts of firms operating in Nigeria. Using the judgmental sampling technique, a sample 
of 50 selected listed firms from the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market where analyzed using the 
annual reports for the period 2006 to 2010. The choice of the selected firms’ arises based on the 
capital structure and the availability of data for the listed firms. The regression analysis method 
was employed as a statistical technique for analyzing the data collected from the annual report of 
the selected firms. Findings from the paper revealed that there is a significant positive relation-
ship between ownership structure and the dividend payout of the sampled firms in Nigeria. In 
addition, the paper revealed that there is a significant negative relationship between financial 
leverages and the dividend payout of firms. Thus the paper concludes that while the ownership 
structure of firms in terms of equity interest appear to have a visible and significant effect on 
dividend payout of firms, on the other hand, the financial leverage have a very significant nega-
tive impact on firms corporate dividend payout policies. 
 
Key words: Dividend Policy, Financial Leverage, Dividend Payouts, Nigerian NSE, Corporate 
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PENGUJIAN PENGARUH STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN DAN  
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN  
PERUSAHAAN TERDAFTAR DI NIGERIA 
ABSTRAK 
Dalam usahanya untuk memberikan perspektif ekonomi yang berkembang kepada masalah divi-
den perusahaan, penelitian ini secara mendasar meneliti pengaruh struktur kepemilikan dan fi-
nancial leverage pada dividend pay outs perusahaan yang beroperasi di Nigeria. Teknik judg-
ments sampling digunakan untuk menentukan sampel sebanyak 50 perusahaan yang diseleksi 
dan terdaftar pasar saham di Nigeria. Laporan tahunan perusahaan periode 2006 sampai 2010 
dianalisis. Pemilihan perusahaan tersebut berdasarkan pada struktur modal dan ketersediaan 
data. Analisis regresi digunakan untuk menganalisis laporan tahunan. Ditemukan terdapat 
hubungan signifikan dan positif antara struktur kepemilikan saham dan dividend payouts peru-
sahaan di Nigeria. Di samping itu, ditemukan juga bahwa terdapat hubungan singifikan dan 
negatif antara financial leverage dan dividend payout. Disimpulkan bahwa struktur kepemilikan 
saham yaitu equity interest berpengaruh signifikan pada dividend payouts, sementara financial 
leverage berpengaruh signifikan dan negatif pada kebijakan dividend payouts perusahaan. 
 
Kata Kunci: Dividend Policy, Financial Leverage, Dividend Payouts, Nigerian NSE, Corpo-
rate Policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dividend policy is one of the most captivat-
ing themes in financial research. It has re-
mained one of the fundamental components 
of corporate policy, and the most controver-
sial topics in corporate finance literature 
(Alii, Khan and Ramirez 1993). Besides 
that, the dividend policy of a firm is a com-
plex and crucial issue in corporate finance. 
Although investors generally agree on some 
key determinants of dividend policy of 
firms, the effect of dividend policy on firm 
performance is largely contended. Dividend 
policy is one of the most important financial 
policies, not only from the viewpoint of the 
company but also from that of the share-
holders, the consumers, the workers, regula-
tory bodies and the government. For a com-
pany, it is a pivotal policy around which 
other financial policies rotate (Alii, Khan 
and Ramirez 1993). Dividend or profit allo-
cation decision is one of the four decision 
areas in finance. According to Ross, Wester-
field and Jaffe (2002) companies view divi-
dend decision as quite important because it 
determines what funds flow to investors and 
what funds are retained by the firm for in-
vestment. More so, it provides information 
to stakeholders on issues relating to a com-
pany’s financial performance.  
More than a half century, financial 
economists and experts have been occupied 
in examining corporate dividend policy. Ac-
cording to Black (1976: 5), the harder we 
look at the dividend picture, the more it 
seems like a puzzle, with pieces that do not 
fit together. At present, academic research-
ers have provided considerable attention and 
thoughts to solving the dividend puzzle, re-
sulting in a large number of conflicting hy-
potheses, theories and explanations (Afza 
2010). Academic researchers in this area of 
corporate finance have mainly focused on 
developed markets; however, additional in-
sight into the dividend policy debate can be 
gained by an examination of developing 
countries, which is currently to the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge is lacking in the 
literature. This paper to this end attempts to 
examine the effect of ownership structure 
and financial leverage on firms’ dividend 
payouts.  
To gain more insight into this paper, the 
paper has been organized as follows. Section 
2 presents an in-depth literature review on 
ownership structure and dividend policy and 
the hypotheses development. Section 3 dis-
cusses the research methodology adopted for 
the study. While section 4 focused on the 
findings of the study, section 5 discusses the 
conclusion. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
The Agency theory according to Ramli 
(2010:171) suggests that large shareholders’ 
ownership may either alleviate or exacerbate 
agency conflicts. A high level of managerial 
ownership could minimize agency problems, 
as managers have to bear a portion of the 
losses arising from their divergent behaviour 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 
1988). The agency theory also suggests that 
dividends can be used as a corporate gov-
ernance instrument to mitigate agency con-
cerns. In a pioneering effort, Black (1976) 
finds no convincing explanation of why 
companies pay cash dividends to their 
shareholders. Dividends according to Ramli 
(2010) can also minimize agency conflicts 
by subjecting companies to the scrutiny of 
capital market monitoring. It can also play a 
significant role in controlling possible 
agency conflicts between large shareholders 
and minority shareholders. By paying divi-
dends, a pro-rata distribution can be guaran-
teed to all shareholders and limit corporate 
wealth from large shareholders’ control 
(Easterbrook 1984). 
 
Ownership and Payout Policy 
Dividend is considered as an unresolved is-
sue in the field of corporate finance. Many 
justifications have been presented in this 
regard. According to Afza and Hassan 
(2011), existing literature on the determi-
nants of dividend policy has its roots in the 
seminal paper of Lintner (1956) and Miller 
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and Modigliani (1961). Lintner (1956) estab-
lish that changes in earnings and existing 
dividend rates are the most significant de-
terminants of a company’s dividend deci-
sion. Miller and Modigliani (1961) presented 
the irrelevance proposition and proved that 
in an ideal capital market, firm’s dividend 
decision is not a thing of value. Concerning 
determinants of dividend policy, many re-
searchers have analyzed the impact of firm 
performance on dividend payouts but the 
evidence on the impact of ownership struc-
ture on the dividend payout of firms is very 
limited especially in a developing economy 
like Nigeria. 
Rozeff (1982) using a sample of 1000 
US firms, argued that in the presence of in-
side equity holders, the need to pay high 
dividend is decreased. He considered aver-
age payout ratio for a period of seven years 
(1974-1980) as a dependent variable. The 
results showed a negative relationship be-
tween inside shareholders and dividend pay-
out, while a positive relationship between 
dispersed shareholding and dividend payout.  
Han et al. (1999) looked at the relation-
ship between institutional ownership and 
dividend payouts. Using the Tobit analysis 
they found positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and corporate divi-
dend policy. Their result established the fact 
that dividends are positively related to insti-
tutional ownership, thus supporting the tax-
based hypothesis that institutional share-
holders prefer dividends over capital. More 
so, Khan (2006) in a related study investi-
gated the ownership structure of 330 large 
listed UK firms. Based on the estimated re-
sults she reported that ownership concentra-
tion has a negative impact on firm’s divi-
dend paying ability. She further analyzed 
ownership compositions and reported that 
ownership by insurance companies is posi-
tively and individual ownership is negatively 
related with dividend policy. 
Jensen et al. (1992) examined interde-
pendence between the determinants of the 
three policy choices, level of inside owner-
ship, leverage and dividend levels, by apply-
ing three stage least squares (3SLS). A 
cross-sectional firm data was analyzed at 
two points in time, 565 firms for 1982 and 
632 firms for 1987. The results proved in-
sider ownership as an important determinant 
of a firm's dividend policy and debt. Invest-
ment and growth were related negatively to 
dividend, while profitability was found posi-
tively associated with dividend 
Bathala and Rao (1995) used OLS to ex-
amine the interrelation between board com-
position and debt, managerial ownership, 
and dividend payout for a sample of 261 
firms. The findings showed a negative rela-
tionship between outside board directors and 
inside ownership, dividend and debt lever-
age. The results described that outside direc-
tors on the board provided important moni-
toring function to control agency conflicts. 
However, Mondher and Moncef (2009) 
while studying Tunisian companies found 
that dividend payment is very much linked 
and affected by highly concentrated owner-
ship. Similarly, Sharif et al. (2010) in a re-
lated study examined the impact of share-
holder ownership on payout ratio for a panel 
of 41 listed companies on Tehran stock ex-
change for the period 2002-2008. The results 
found a significant positive relationship be-
tween ownership concentration, institutional 
shareholding and payout ratio. A negative 
association was also found between the indi-
vidual shareholders and payout ratio. 
Kumar (2006) analyzed a panel of In-
dian firms over the period of 1994-2000 to 
test the relationship between corporate gov-
ernance, ownership structure and dividend 
payout. The results revealed that ownership 
by corporations and directors was positively 
related with dividend but the squared corpo-
rate ownership was negatively related. Simi-
larly, Syed and Wasim (2011) in a study of 
taken from the companies listed at Karachi 
Stock Exchange (KSE) observed that a posi-
tive relationship exists between ownership 
structures and dividend payout policy of 
listed firms in Karachi. 
Nevertheless, while several prior em-
pirical studies from developed economies 
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have shed light on the relationship between 
ownership structure and dividend payout of 
firms, the same is not true in developing 
economies like Nigeria. This study therefore 
tends to fill this gap in literature by examin-
ing the relationship between the ownership 
structure of firms’ and the dividend payout 
of listed firms in Nigeria.  
 
Development of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested in this study are 
stated below in their null forms: 
H0: There is no significant relationship 
between the ownership structure of firms’ and 
the dividend payout of listed firms in Nigeria.  
H0: There is no significant relationship 
between firms’ financial leverage and the 
dividend payout of listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the 
annual reports for the period 2006-2010 
were analyzed. However, using the judg-
mental sampling technique; a total of 50 
listed firms operating in high profile indus-
tries in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were 
selected. This represents 20.5% of the total 
population. This is consistent with the 
propositions of Krejcie & Morgan (1970) 
where a minimum of 5% of a defined popu-
lation is considered as an appropriate sample 
size in making generalization. The choice of 
the sampled firms was based on the fre-
quency in which dividends are paid to 
shareholders. In addition, these firms were 
selected based on the availability of owner-
ship structure data for the period under con-
sideration. Nevertheless, in analyzing the 
research hypothesis, the ordinary least 
square (OLS) was used in the estimation of 
the regression equation under consideration.  
 
Model Specification 
The following model is used to examine the 
association between independent and the 
dependent variables of the listed firms in 
Nigeria. 
DPO it = f (OSit, Leverageit, eit). (1) 
This can be written in explicit form as: 
DPO it  = β0 +  β1OSit + β2LEVit + eit. (2) 
Where: 
DPO it = Dividend Payout ratio is measured 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum  Maximum Mean  Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
DPO 50 .0000 .9950 .4315 .3156 .3800 -1.2800
OS 50 .0010 .9810 .1495 .2858 2.3930 4.0930
LEV 50 .0013 6.6806 .9213 1.6943 2.0160 3.1160
Valid N 50   
 
Table 2 
Pearson Correlations for Selected Firms in Nigeria 
 
 DPO OS LEV 
1   
   
DPO            Pearson Correlation 
                    Sig. (2-tailed) 
                    N     50   
.597** 1  
.000   
OS               Pearson Correlation 
                    Sig. (2-tailed) 
                    N     50 50  
-.407** .253** 1 
.003 .076  
LEV           Pearson Correlation 
                    Sig. (2-tailed) 
                    N     50 50 50 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Volume 16, No. 2, August 2013, pages 251 – 258 
Accreditation No. 80/DIKTI/Kep/2012 
255 
as the dividend per equity share 
divided by earnings per share 
OS it  = Ownership structure has been cal-
culated by the percentage of 
shares held by board of directors 
divided by total numbers of shares 
Lev it  = Financial leverage as a proxy is 
defined as a firms total debt di-
vided by its total Equity. 
e  =  Stochastic or disturbance term. 
t  = Time dimension of the Variables  
β0  =  Constant or Intercept. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
Results from our descriptive statistics as pre-
sented in Table 1 present a mean dividend 
payout of about 0.4315 for the firms under 
consideration. This represents an averaged 
percentage distribution of about 43% for the 
period 2006-2010. On the other hand; the de-
scriptive statistics results on ownership struc-
ture and firms financial leverage as depicted in 
Table 1 indicates an averaged mean distribu-
tion value of about 0.1495 and 0.9213 respec-
tively for the sampled listed firms in the Nige-
rian Stock Exchange market. Nevertheless, a 
review of empirical findings from the Pearson 
Correlation analysis on the relationship be-
tween ownership structure and firms dividend 
payouts shows that there is a positive correla-
tion between the ownership structure of firms 
and the dividend payout of listed firms in Ni-
geria, and it is significant at 1% probability 
level with a correlation coefficient (r) of 0.597. 
In addition, the Pearson correlation analysis 
result further shows that there is a negative 
correlation between financial leverage and the 
dividend payout of listed firms in Nigeria and 
it is also significant at 1% probability level 
with a correlation coefficient (r) of about -
0.407 (see Table 2).  
Furthermore, the test for multicollinearity 
was carried out before analyzing the regres-
sion model. According to Field (2000), this 
test is necessary because multicollinearity can 
affect the parameters of a regression model. 
Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010) suggested that 
a tolerance value less than 0.1 indicates a se-
rious multi-colinearity problem between the 
independent variables. Nevertheless, since all 
values are more than 0.10, there is no issue of 
multi-colinearity between the independent 
variables. Also, Myers (1990) suggested that 
a variance inflation factor (VIF) value greater 
than 10 calls for concern, however, for this 
study, the VIF values are less than 10. 
In addition, findings from the regression 
analysis result for the selected firms as de-
picted in Table 3 indicates that from the 
model, the R2 which is often referred to as the 
coefficient of determination of the variables 
was .426. The R-Squared which is also a 
measure of the overall fitness of the model 
indicates that the model is capable of explain-
Table 3 
Model Summary 
 
Change Statistics 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted
R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R Square 
Change 
F 
change df1 df2 
Sig F 
Change 
1 .653a .426 .402 .244 .426 17.469 2 47 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LEV, OS. 
 
Table 4 
ANOVAb 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
Residual 
Total 
2.081 
2.799 
4.879 
2 
47 
49 
1.040 
.060 
 
17.469 .000a 
a. Predictors: (Constant),LEV,  OS. 
b. Dependent Variable: DPO. 
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ing about 43% of the variability of firms’ divi-
dend payout. This means that the model ex-
plains about 43% of the systematic variation in 
the dependent variable. That is, about 54% of 
the variations in dividend payout policies of 
the sampled firms are accounted for by other 
factors not captured by the model. This result 
is complimented by the adjusted R2 (adjusted 
R-squared) of about 40%, which is in essence 
the proportion of total variance that is ex-
plained by the model. Similarly, findings from 
the Fishers ratio (i.e. the F-Statistics which is a 
proof of the validity of the estimated model) as 
reflected in Table 4, presents a p-value that is 
less than 0.05 (p-value < 0.05); this invariably 
suggests clearly that simultaneously the expla-
natory variable (i.e. ownership structure and 
financial leverage) are significantly associated 
with the dependent variable (dividend payout).  
Similarly, consistent with our apriori ex-
pectations (i.e. β1 > 0), further empirical find-
ings provided in Table 5 shows that there is a 
significant positive relationship between 
ownership structure and the dividend payout 
of the sampled firms in Nigeria. This is evi-
dent in the t-statistics value of (4.622 and a p-
value = .000). This outcome basically implies 
that the companies where more owners are 
present on the board pay more dividends as 
far as Nigeria corporate culture is concerned. 
That is, companies where more owners are 
sitting in the board, they tend to take care for 
the dividends. More so, cash dividend level is 
higher where the owners’ presence in the 
board of directors is higher. This outcome in 
a nutshell points to the fact that the ownership 
structure of firms appears to have a visible 
and significant effect on the dividend payout 
of firms. This outcome however supports the 
earlier work of Kouki and Guizani (2009), 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Kouki and Gui-
zani (2006), Holder et al. (1998) where own-
ership structure was found to have a signifi-
cant positive impact on the dividend policies 
of firms. 
On the other hand, consistent with our 
apriority expectations (i.e. β2 < 0), empirical 
findings from the regression analysis on the 
second hypothesis indicates clearly that a 
significant negative relationship does exist 
between financial leverage and the dividend 
payout policies of the sampled firms in Ni-
geria. This is evident in the t-statistics value 
of (-2.392 and a p-value = .021). This result 
basically implies that the financial leverage 
of a firm has a negative impact on the divi-
dend payout of firms. This basically indi-
cates less dividend payments by highly in-
debted firms. That is, firms with high finan-
cial leverage tend to pay lower dividend to 
avoid the higher cost of raising external 
capital for the company. In essence, highly 
Table 5 
Coefficientsb 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients
Collinearity 
Statistics Model 
B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 
        OS 
        LEV 
.391 
.583 
-.051 
.046 
.126 
.021 
 
.528 
-.273 
8.501 
4.622 
-2.392
.000 
.000 
.021 
 
.936 
.936 
 
1.069 
1.069 
a. Dependent Variable: DPO. 
 
Table 6 
Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
LEV 1.07 0.936 
OS 1.07 0.936 
Mean VIF 1.07  
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levered firms look forward to maintaining 
their internal cash flow to fulfill duties, in-
stead of distributing available cash to share-
holders and protect their creditors. This re-
sult nevertheless, corroborates the work of 
Faccio et al. (2001), Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003), Al-Malkawi (2007) where they ob-
served that the level of financial leverage 
negatively affects firm’s dividend policy. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study examined the relationship be-
tween the ownership structure and the divi-
dend policies of listed firms operating in 
Nigeria. It also examined the relationship 
between financial leverage and the dividend 
policies of listed firms in Nigeria. The study 
came up with the following findings that are 
of salient importance to scholars investigat-
ing dividend issues in the Nigerian context. 
Firstly, the study observed that the owner-
ship structure of firms has a significant im-
pact on the dividend payout of listed firms in 
Nigeria. That is, companies where there are 
more shareholders are sitting in the board 
basically tries to influence their power in the 
decision making regarding dividend policy. 
This in the long run basically reduces the 
agency conflict and develops the trust of the 
outsiders and shareholder on the company.  
Secondly, findings from the second hy-
pothesis validate the propositions provided 
in (Rozeff 1982; Faccio et al. 2001; Gugler 
and Yurtoglu 2003; Al-Malkawi 2007) 
where they observed that the level of finan-
cial leverage negatively affects firm’s divi-
dend policy. More so, firms with high finan-
cial leverage tend to pay lower dividend to 
avoid the higher cost of raising external 
capital for the company. Consequently, the 
paper concludes that while the ownership 
structure of firms in terms of equity interest 
appear to have a visible and significant ef-
fect on dividend payout of firms, on the 
other hand, the financial leverage of a firm 
basically have a very significant negative 
impact on firms dividend payout policies.  
This study is however limited by the fact 
that the sample only covers five (5) years data 
from the Nigerian stock exchange market. 
Also, only one corporate governance variable 
was considered in the study. However, Future 
research could consider other corporate gov-
ernance variables not considered in this study. 
In addition, could examine the effects of board 
characteristics and ownership identity on the 
dividend policy of firms in Nigeria. 
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